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Abstract
There has been widespread concern at the level of mobile termination charges, leading to increasingly
severe price controls. Oftel and the Competition Commission identified the Caller Pays Principle (CPP)
as the source of the market power that enabled termination charges to be set above cost. Both accepted
that the alternative Receiver Pays Principle (RPP) would solve the monopoly problem, but rejected it
primarily because RPP might lead to significant numbers of users switching off their mobile phones.
Evidence from RPP countries is consistent with RPP solving market power problems.  CPP is almost
certainly less efficient than RPP. US and other evidence suggests that the argument about customers
switching off phones is not tenable. If the aim is efficient resource allocation, undistorted by excessive
termination charges and subsidised handsets, to be achieved by competition rather than price controls,
then RPP is preferable to CPP.
JEL classification: L51, L96
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Introduction
Mobile termination charges – the charges that mobile operators levy on each
other and on fixed network operators for terminating calls on their networks
- have become an increasing focus of concern in most countries throughout
the world. The level of these charges is perceived to be high both in absolute
terms and in relation to termination charges on fixed networks. Insofar as
there are now (since 2002) more mobile subscribers than fixed subscribers,
such charges are perceived to be increasingly important, and to constitute an
inhibition on the growth of telecommunications services generally. 2
Increasingly, the charges have become the object of regulatory attention.3
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 E.g. “In most countries across the world, termination on mobile networks is
significantly more costly than termination on fixed networks. … excessive
interconnection charges can be cited as a serious inhibitor to future growth of national
and international traffic in mobile networks.” Valerie Feldmann (consultant), “Mobile
Overtakes Fixed: Implications for Policy and Regulation”, ITU Strategy and Policy Unit,
June 2003, p. 6 (available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/mobileovertakes)
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 E.g. “With growing amounts of international traffic flowing to mobile handsets, mobile
termination costs have become an increasingly important issue for international carriers,
consumers, and regulatory agencies. … The grave reality of these effects, exacerbated by
burgeoning call volumes, has fomented a complete reversal in regulatory trends over the
past few years. Where national regulatory agencies (NRAs) were once more concerned
with stimulating the industry growth and competition, often through implementing
calling party pays (CPP) payment structures and pricing constraints on fixed
interconnection, they are now scrutinising the charges levied for connection to the
networks and, in some cases, intervening on behalf of fixed-line operators.”
Telegeography 2004, pp. 48, 51
2Regulation of mobile termination charges has perhaps been most thoroughly
analysed and is of longest standing in the UK. RPI-9 price controls on the
two largest operators were put into effect from 1998 to 2002, requiring
termination charges to be reduced by 9 per cent per year in real terms. After
a lengthy consultation and investigation, Oftel concluded at the end of 2001
that mobile termination charges were still substantially in excess of cost. It
proposed price controls of RPI-12 for the next four years on the four mobile
companies Vodafone, O2 (formerly BT Cellnet), Orange and T-Mobile
(formerly One2One). The companies objected and the matter was referred to
the Competition Commission (henceforth the Commission).
The Commission broadly endorsed Oftel’s proposals. It concluded4 that
competitive pressures did not constrain termination charges; that termination
charges should in principle be cost-reflective; that they were presently some
30 to 40 per cent in excess of a fair charge (and at present levels would be up
to double the fair charge by 2005/06); that this led to a series of public
interest detriments that were not offset by public interest benefits that could
justify their continuation; that a price cap was the only remedy likely to
address these detriments effectively; and that this price cap should be at the
rate of RPI-15 for the next four years. The Commission considered that this
would yield significant welfare gains without an increase in average retail
prices or a significant loss of retail subscribers. The Commission thus
recommended an even more severe price cap than Oftel, requiring
termination charges to reduce by 15 per cent per year for the next four years.
The companies took the Commission to judicial review, but without success.
The price cap is presently in course of implementation.
Other countries have followed the UK lead. Formal or informal regulatory
pressures have been applied to mobile termination rates in many European
countries5, and in Australia and Japan.6 The US, whose mobile network is
not characterised by high mobile termination rates, has expressed concern
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 E.g. “the UK, French, Italian, Dutch and Portuguese regulatory authorities have decided
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services that mobile operators will be obliged to implement over the coming years.”
Mobile Services Review 2003, ACCC, April 2003.
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 E.g. Crandall and Sidak, 2004, pp. 8-15.
3about European practices.7 The FCC has been considering whether to take
action.8 It has now “announced that it will issue a Notice of Inquiry to
evaluate the effect of high foreign mobile termination rates on US
consumers and competition”.9
Is widespread and severe regulation really needed in what otherwise seems
to be a flourishing and competitive industry? Economists differ as to the
seriousness of the problem, and as to the appropriate remedy.10
Some have argued or assumed that price controls are needed to deal with
market power, and have focused on precisely how these should be set – for
example, whether termination charge should be equal to marginal cost, or
above it by an allowance for consumption externalities.11 Others have
questioned whether the welfare loss associated with excessive termination
charges is as significant as Oftel and the Commission assumed. Yet others
have suggested that any market failure can be overcome in other ways,
including by facilitating more competition to provide termination services or
by increasing customer information.
There seems to be recognition, not least by Oftel, the Commission and
among economists that have studied the matter, that the high termination
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 See Crandall and Sidak 2004 for a recent summary; also Feasey (2004) for a
forthcoming collection of papers on the Commission’s report.
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 This assumes, as explained shortly, that a termination charge above marginal cost leads
to a subsidy on handsets or connection/subscription charges, and thereby encourages
more subscribers to join the network, which is assumed to be beneficial for other
subscribers.
4charges reflect monopoly power created by the arrangement of Caller Pays
Principle (abbreviated to CPP) that is used throughout Europe and most
other countries. The main alternative to the CPP arrangement is the Receiver
Pays Principle (RPP)12 as used in North America, China and a few other
Asian countries. In the RPP countries termination charges are significantly
lower and there seems to be no need for regulation of them.13
Few economic papers seem to have looked in any detail at RPP as an
alternative to CPP, but those that have tend to favour it. Doyle and Smith
(1998) explain why RPP would change the incentives on mobile operators
and increase competition. Crandall and Sidak (2004) expand on this and
examine experience in US and Canada. They conclude that “MPP [RPP] is
the better option for pricing mobile calls”. In their view “CPP without price
regulation
 is a second-best solution”. (p. 45 italics in original)
Yet there has been no move from CPP to RPP; in fact at least 27 countries
have changed from RPP to CPP since 1991.14 Oftel and the Commission
raised the possibility of changing to RPP but dismissed it rather cursorily.
The purpose of this paper is to explore this option more thoroughly.
The material is grouped in six main sections:
- An economic analysis of the call termination market and problem, as
reflected in the Oftel and Commission reports, and the analysis of
economists
- the impact of CPP on the allocation of resources and the welfare gains
and losses
- the views of Oftel and the Commission on the advantages and
disadvantages of RPP
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 In the US the terms Mobile Party Pays (MPP) and Wireless Party Pays (WPP) are used
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 E.g. Ben Petrazzini, Fixed-Mobile interconnection case studies, ITU Strategies and
Policy Unit, Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Workshop, ITU New Initiatives Program,
Geneva, 20-22 September 2000; Feldmann, Figure 9 p. 25; Crandall and Sidak 2004. See
also the discussion in section 6 below.
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 Stefan Zehle, “CPP Benchmark Report”, Coleago Consulting Ltd, 23 February 2003,
Figure 1, p. 2. (available at http://www.coleago.co.uk/downloads.php). 21 of these
countries are from Central and South America and the Caribbean; the remaining six in
chronological order are Czech Republic, Mongolia, Cambodia, Romania, Pakistan and
India.
5- CPP, RPP and the efficient pattern of calling
- the reported phenomenon of switching off of mobile phones, and the
experience of developing countries overseas that use RPP including
those that have changed to CPP
- the experience of RPP in the USA and a comparison of .termination
charges, prices, penetration ratios and usage.
A final section concludes.
1. Economic analysis of the call termination market
At first sight, the high level of mobile termination charges presents a
paradox. On the one hand, the mobile sector has been characterised by
outstanding performance over the last few years. This includes new entry,
rapid growth in number of mobile phones and subscriber penetration, price
reductions and quality improvements, significant innovation, and in general
all the signs of a competitive industry. This is particularly the case for the
UK - the FCC notes that “The UK is widely regarded as the most
competitive large mobile market in Western Europe.”15 - but it is true
elsewhere too. On the other hand, the charges for terminating calls on
mobile networks have remained stubbornly high: the Competition
Commission calculated that they were 30 to 40 per cent above what it called
a fair charge16 and the widespread objections to the charges have been noted
above. How are these two elements mutually consistent?
a) Inadequate competition?
Part of the explanation might be that the mobile market is not as competitive
as it seems. Oftel has argued that while competition in the mobile sector is
developing, the market is not yet fully or effectively competitive, only
‘prospectively competitive’.
As evidence for this lack of fully effective competition Oftel instanced the
very high profit rate achieved by Vodafone. A counter to this argument was
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Commercial Mobile Services, 8th Report, WT Docket No 02-379, FCC 03-150, 14 July
2003, para 203, p. 89
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 The Commission based this ‘fair charge’ on “the Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC)
of call termination (including fixed and common network costs) and a mark-up for
relevant non-network costs.” (CC p. 4) There was also “a small mark-up for the network
externality”.
6that the average profit rate in the mobile sector as a whole was far from
excessive. The other companies were barely covering their costs of capital or
in some cases making losses. Vodafone’s explanation for its own high
profits was essentially superior efficiency: a better and more profitable mix
of customers and a better designed and managed network with lower costs.
The Commission “broadly concurred” with Oftel’s view that “persistent high
returns were difficult to reconcile with a competitive sector, because over
time competitors should be able to replicate efficiencies or produce rival
innovations”. However, it noted that “Vodafone’s returns have been earned
in a period when the mobile phone market has been expanding extremely
rapidly” and in these circumstances “we do not conclude that Vodafone’s
high profit levels … demonstrate, in themselves, ineffective competition”.
(p. 48)
The Commission in fact found that there was “intense competition among
the mobile network operators (MNOs) to attract and sign up subscribers to
their networks”. However, there was “less effective competition in call
origination”. Furthermore, “each of the MNOs has a monopoly of call
termination on its own network”. “All of this indicates, in our view, less than
effective competition at the retail level.” (CC para 2.211)17
b) The effect of CPP on termination charging
Nevertheless, the effectiveness or otherwise of competition at the retail level
was not the explanation for the high level of termination charges. The
explanation for the latter, as proposed by Oftel and accepted by the
Commission, lay in the monopoly of termination.
Each mobile network operator has a monopoly of the termination of calls
made to subscribers on its own network. Adoption of the “caller pays
principle” (CPP) means that mobile operators can charge other operators for
termination, and these other operators – and hence their subscribers - have to
pay these charges (or find alternatives to making the call). It is therefore
plausible that each mobile operator should wish to charge a monopoly price
for access by subscribers of other networks.
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 This conclusion is broadly consistent with Oftel’s analysis. For Oftel’s more recent
views, see Wholesale mobile voice call termination consultation, 19 December 2003.
7However, if there were only mobile operators to consider, and if their
subscribers made roughly the same number of calls to each other (as is
broadly the case in the UK), it is arguable that the mobile operators would
not find it worthwhile to charge each other for termination. Doing so would
be costly in terms of administration and collection, and would simply
circulate revenues between them to no good effect. Indeed, increasing the
prices of ‘off-net’ calls (calls made to subscribers of other networks) would
reduce the use and potentially the profitability of the mobile networks as a
whole.
In practice, the market comprises fixed as well as mobile operators. Indeed,
in most countries the majority of the calls for which termination charges are
levied come from fixed network operators (FNOs) rather than from other
mobile operators 18. In the UK (and many other countries) the termination
charges levied by the fixed operators (such as BT) are regulated and capped
at about equal to cost. If the mobile operators set their termination charges
above cost, and the fixed operators do not, there is a net flow of revenue
from the fixed network and its customers to the mobile networks and their
customers. This may more than compensate for the loss of business from
higher charges. Hence, in these circumstances, high termination charges are
potentially profitable for mobile operators.19
But are the mobile operators able to keep these increased revenues from the
higher termination charges? Not if the mobile sector is competitive. Each
additional subscriber is likely to be called by subscribers on other mobile
and fixed networks, so will bring a flow of termination charge revenues to
the mobile operator. Each mobile operator will therefore try by a variety of
means to attract subscribers to its network. This may involve incurring
marketing costs, cutting other prices, and offering various subsidies. As the
Commission put it, “There is vigorous competition among the MNOs to
attract and sign up subscribers to their networks, for example through the
payment of incentives and discounts to retailers, and handset subsidies to
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 “Calls to mobiles from FNOs accounted for a much larger proportion (70 per cent) of
termination minutes than off-net calls (about 30 per cent) in 2001/02 (mobile-to-mobile,
or on-net calls, do not attract termination charges), and provided nearly all the MNOs’ net
revenue from call termination charges in that year.” (CC p. 3)
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 The FCC is quite explicit about this cross-subsidy. “In effect, high termination rates on
fixed-to-mobile calls have served to promote the development of the mobile telephone
industry in Europe by directing subsidies from established fixed-line services to mobile
services.” 8th Mobile Report, para 210, p. 91.
8customers, but this is funded by excess returns from termination charges.”
(CC p. 4) The Commission calculated that “the average net cost of acquiring
a new customer was around £100”. (p. 52)
In the limit, mobile operators would find it worthwhile to spend up to the
expected value of the net revenue from termination charges in order to
attract new subscribers. The more competitive the market, the more likely
this is to happen, because the mobile operators have no alternative but to do
so.20 Conversely, the less competitive the retail market, the more that the
surpluses would remain with the operators instead of being passed through
to the subscribers.
This analysis explains how high termination charges facilitated by the CPP
principle are consistent with different degrees of competition in the mobile
sector as a whole. This explanation is consistent with the evidence of
relatively strong performance and competition in the UK mobile sector.
However, it also implies that increasing competition in the mobile sector
will not bring relief from the problem of high termination charges as long as
the CPP principle continues to apply. Even new entry associated with the
potential development of third generation technology would not overcome
the problem. In other words, if price controls are considered necessary to
combat high mobile termination charges, they would seem to be a permanent
rather than transitional phenomenon.
c) Views of economists
A number of economists have analysed network termination charges in
recent years.21 There seems to be widespread acceptance of the general
proposition that, with CPP and under market conditions typically obtaining,
mobile operators do have market power over terminations and have an
incentive to exercise this by setting high termination charges. These charges
may be at the monopoly level, even in the face of competition between
mobile networks. They may even be above. For example, if callers do not
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 “Vodafone said there was nothing ‘discretionary’ about its marketing expenditure: it
was a sign of how effective competition was that each MNO was forced to incur ever
greater costs to win and retain subscribers, up to the point at which any excess profits
were competed away.” (CC p. 50)
21
 E.g. Armstrong 1998, Doyle and Smith 1998, Gans and King 1999, Jeon et al 2001,
Wright 2002, Crandall and Sidak 2004, Gans et al 2004. In fact, the chairman of the
Commission panel had earlier written on this topic, Geroski et al 1989.
9know the level of charges applicable to a particular call and assume it to be
at the average level charged by all operators, then larger operators would
have an interest in reducing charges if that increased total traffic in the
sector, but small operators including new entrants would find it profitable to
set higher charges.22
2. Welfare gains and losses
The views to the Commission, and its own conclusions, were a mixture of
concerns about income distribution and real resource loss.
a) views of the parties and the Commission
If the mobile market is competitive, does the precise pattern of charges
matter? The mobile operators argued that it did not: “because most people
now have a mobile phone, what consumers lose in paying high termination
charges they gain on cheap handsets and competitively priced on-net calls.”
(CC p. 4)
The Commission rejected those arguments.
Some callers to mobiles from fixed-line telephones or from payphones
do not themselves own a mobile phone, and so subsidize mobile
customers through high call termination charges, with almost no
reciprocal benefit. Moreover, to the extent that callers with both fixed
and mobile phones use their fixed lines to call mobiles more than they
use their mobile phone, they suffer a detriment due to the high
termination charges of the MNOs. The high prices of fixed-to-mobile,
and low prices of on-net, calls also tend to skew usage from the lower-
cost (that is, fixed) technology to the higher-cost (that is mobile)
technology. (CC p. 4)
The Commission summarised (CC p. 5) the public interest detriments of the
excessive termination charges as follows:
a) consumers pay too much for fixed-to-mobile and off-net calls
b) as a result, too few fixed-to-mobile calls are made
c) some consumers (those who make more higher priced calls) unfairly
subsidise other consumers (those who make more lower price calls or
mainly receive calls or who make little use of their mobile phones)
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d) there are significant distortions in competition: undervaluation of
handsets by customers and greater turnover or ‘churn’ of customers
between networks, leading to greater expenditure in mobile customer
acquisition
e) greater use of higher-cost (mobile) technology at the expense of the
lower-cost (fixed) alternative.
b) income distribution and real resource loss
Some of these items - the quoted view of the mobile operators, the
Commission’s rejection of this, and the first and third of the Commission’s
detriments - are essentially about transfers of income or revenue. Such
transfers - from consumers to producers, or from one set of consumers to
another – may be a public policy concern, but they do not involve what
economists would call real resource costs.
The implication of the quoted operators’ view, and indeed of the economic
analysis of this issue that the Commission broadly accepted, is that the net
transfer of income from consumers in aggregate to producers in aggregate is
minimal. Therefore, to the extent that the Commission gave weight to these
income transfer detriments, it was taking a view on behalf of particular
subsets of customers (those who made more fixed-to-mobile and off-net
calls) and against other subsets of consumers (those who made more on-net
calls or mainly received calls or made little use of their mobile phones). It
was not acting to increase benefits to customers generally.
The other detriments do involve real resource costs. They involve a
comparison with the allocation of resources assumed to obtain in a fully
competitive or ‘optimal’ benchmark situation. The contention is that, under
present arrangements with termination charges in excess of cost and handset
prices and other charges below cost, excessive resources are devoted to
certain goods and services (handsets, the acquisition of mobile customers
and the use of mobile networks generally) while inadequate resources are
devoted to other uses (the number of fixed-to-mobile calls and the use of
fixed networks generally). As a result, the presumption is that customers as a
whole are worse off than if the resources available were used in the way that
customers would most prefer.
The Commission did not go into detail on these points. For example, after
listing the detriments of the present level of charges, its Summary simply
11
comments that “We did not find that there were … any offsetting public
interest benefits arising from the termination charges set by the four MNOs
being in excess of the fair charge, which could justify their continuation.”
(CC p. 5)
c) characterising the benefits and detriments
It is worth exploring a little more what these “offsetting public benefits”
might be. The ‘misallocated’ resources are not wasted; they do not produce
goods and services of no value at all. Rather, they produce goods and
services that customers do value, albeit assumed not as highly as the
preferred goods and services. In fact, the economic model set out above
implies that the then-obtaining set of prices yields a set of benefits
essentially corresponding to the inverse of the detriments identified by the
Commission. That is, as a result of the higher termination charges that
presently obtain:
a) consumers pay less than they otherwise would for on-net mobile calls
b) as a result, more on-net mobile calls are made
c) some consumers benefit from subsidies from other consumers
d) handsets are less costly to customers than they otherwise would be,
changing networks is also easier and less costly, and mobile operators
devote more resources to acquiring and keeping customers than they
otherwise would
e) mobile calls are less expensive than they otherwise would be, relative
to fixed calls, so that mobile networks offer more effective
competition to the incumbent fixed networks than they otherwise
would do.
It is not clear that higher customer acquisition costs are an unambiguous
disadvantage. Based on what is said in the Commission report (CC pp. 50-
54), higher termination charges and the consequent greater attractiveness of
customers mean that there is more frequent upgrading of handsets, mobile
operators pay greater attention to designing and offering packages including
tariffs that will appeal to customers, greater attention is paid to informing
customers about the alternatives available, there is greater choice including
of payment arrangements, retailers have greater incentive to be more
attractive to customers, and customer care costs are higher than they
otherwise would be. Thus customer acquisition costs are higher because the
quality of customer service is higher.
12
This is not to argue that this list of benefits (some of which are transfers of
income and others of which reflect real resource costs) outweighs the
Commission’s list of detriments. Rather, it is to emphasise that the system of
high termination charges and low access charges has benefits as well as
detriments. Consequently, any reform to that system is likely to involve
reducing benefits as well as reducing detriments. The key question for public
policy is not whether some new arrangement such as a tighter price cap will
reduce the identified detriments, but whether that reduction in detriments
outweighs the reduction in benefits.
d) quantifying the costs and benefits
The calculation of the costs and benefits of the present arrangements, and of
changes to them, is therefore of considerable importance. Given the complex
interrelationships between termination charges and the different kinds of call
charges, subscription charges and handset prices, some sophisticated
modelling might be expected. This was indeed the case. It seems that all the
mobile operators hired consultants to model the situation, as did Oftel and
the Commission itself. There was then a lengthy and detailed debate about
the appropriate models and assumptions. In its Appendix 9 the Commission
describes at some length these models and the contested assumptions and the
discussion process.
The Commission’s own conclusion was that “Regulating termination
charges from current levels produces welfare gains (in net present value
NPV terms) of around £700 million (with an immediate reduction in
charges) and around £325 million (with a progressive reduction in charges)
over the three year control period.” It is unfortunate, however, that neither
the summary nor the conclusions chapter gives any outline of the
Commission’s own assumptions and the implications of its model for prices,
call charges, number of subscribers, and so on. The debate may have been
accessible to the participants, but it is difficult for an outside observer to
understand and appraise the Commission’s position. The adequacy of the
Commission’s assumptions therefore becomes somewhat a matter of faith.23
These assumptions are particularly sensitive given the remarkable diversity
of views among the companies on all the parameters in the models used, and
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 There is some further discussion of Oftel’s cost-benefit analysis in Oftel, Wholesale
mobile voice call termination consultation, 19 December 2003, annex L.
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the considerable criticism of the Commission’s assumptions and
conclusions. For example,
Professor James Mirrlees of the University of Cambridge explains that
the welfare gains that could be realised by a move toward regulation
of mobile call termination rates would be modest at best. Mirrlees
estimates that the annual welfare increase would be roughly one tenth
the size of the benefits upon which the UK’s Competition
Commission relied in justifying its price cap on mobile termination
rates (£4.7 million versus £54.5 million). He argues that the
Commission failed to understand that, as mobile termination rates
increase, mobile operators lower other mobile rates, which stimulates
mobile subscriptions and increases welfare in the unregulated
scenario.24
e) the waterbed effect
The notion that, as mobile termination rates increase, mobile operators lower
other mobile rates, was known as “the waterbed effect”. This succinctly
encapsulates the economic analysis of the termination market as set out
above. It works both ways of course. If termination charges are reduced,
then it will be less profitable to subsidise customers into the network. The
prices of handsets, access and on-net calls will therefore increase as a
consequence of the fall in revenue from termination charges.
The extent of the waterbed effect impacts on customers and mobile operators
in opposite directions. A 100 per cent waterbed effect implies that
companies will recover all the lost revenues from a reduction in termination
charges – but by the same token this implies that benefits to customers from
the termination charge reductions will be heavily offset by the
countervailing increases in other charges. Similarly, a zero waterbed effect
means that a reduction in termination charges yields maximum benefits to
customers. However, it allows no offsetting increase in other revenues to
mobile companies, and hence may call into question their continued
viability.
Oftel’s dilemma on this issue is therefore understandable. At one point it
assumed a 50 per cent waterbed effect, arguing that 50 per cent of the
                                                
24
 Crandall and Sidak 2004, p. 4, citing the witness statement of Mirrlees in the judicial
review, 5 March 2003.
14
reductions in termination charges would be recovered in the form of
increases in other charges. Some companies pointed out that if operators
recovered only 50 per cent of the loss in termination charges revenue, this
would be inconsistent with maintaining profitability, given that most of them
were scarcely earning a return to cover their cost of capital. Something near
a full waterbed effect would be necessary for these companies to maintain
profitability. However, the fuller the waterbed effect, the greater the
increases in other charges as termination charges are reduced, which
considerably reduces the welfare gain from lowering termination charges.25
f) the contrast with other price controls
It is not the purpose of this paper to take a view on the precise level of the
waterbed effect, or on the likely effects of reducing termination charges and
the plausible value to be attached to the resulting benefits and detriments. I
understand that most of Oftel’s work, and work done for it by Jeffrey Rohlfs,
in fact assumes that a full waterbed effect applies. However, Oftel points out
that the welfare gains in its analysis are primarily driven, not by the level of
the waterbed effect, or the overall price level, but by the ‘dead-weight loss’
from the excessive termination charges plus the further ‘dead-weight loss’
from the use of excess profits to fund below-cost retail services.
Oftel’s approach, which the Commission adopted, thus focuses on what
economists call ‘allocative efficiency’: an improved allocation of resources.
It is worth emphasising that the logic of this approach demands that detailed
welfare calculations be done, no matter how reliable or otherwise they can
ever hope to be. Moreover, the use of allocative efficiency as the benchmark
means that the net benefits are always likely to be small. In this respect the
price controls on mobile termination charges stand in contrast to price
controls on other utility networks.
To explain, the RPI-X price controls on gas, electricity and water networks
serve two main functions: they protect customers from excessive prices and
they stimulate the companies to greater efficiency.
                                                
25
 I understand that most of Oftel’s work, and work done for it by Jeffrey Rohlfs, assumes
that a full waterbed effect applies. However, Oftel points out that the welfare gains in its
analysis are primarily driven, not by the level of the waterbed effect, or the overall price
level, but by the dead-weight loss from the excessive termination charges plus the further
deadweight loss from the use of excess profits to fund below-cost retail services.
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The first function has in practice led to significant redistributions of income
from producers to consumers, in all three sectors mentioned. However, the
logic of the economic analysis underlying the determination of mobile
termination rates – in simple terms the waterbed effect – means that the
control on mobile termination charges does not serve this function. As noted
earlier, it may serve to redistribute income between different types of
consumers, but not between consumers and producers.
The second function of utility price controls has also been remarkably
effective elsewhere. Operating costs in particular have reduced spectacularly
in gas and electricity, and to a substantial extent in water too. No doubt this
reflected the higher costs that accumulated over many years of operation in
the nationalised sector of the economy. However, this function too is
inapplicable to mobile termination charges: the mobile networks were not
built and have never operated in the nationalised sector, and it has not been
argued that a purpose of the control has been to improve the efficiency of the
mobile operators.
In contrast, the justification for a price control on mobile termination
charges depends essentially on promoting allocative efficiency. This benefit
– the so-called welfare triangle or dead-weight loss - is likely to be an order
of magnitude smaller than the gains from reducing prices or costs. (It reflects
the product of two relatively small magnitudes: a change in price or cost
times a change in output rather than times output itself.) It also requires
calculating not only the costs and benefits of the present allocation of
resources, but also predicting what the alternative allocation of resources
would be and what the costs and values of the resulting outputs would be. As
indicated, this is by no means a straightforward task, and for the most part
not one that regulators of other utility sectors have taken on board.
3. Oftel and the Commission on the “Receiving Party Pays” principle
a) the advantages of RPP
Present arrangements in the UK are based on the “calling party pays”
principle, or CPP. In some other countries the “receiving party pays”
principle, or RPP, obtains, notably in the US and Canada where it is known
as “mobile party pays” or MPP.
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The Commission “considered whether a system of RPP whereby the billing
systems of the MNOs [Mobile Network Operators] would be modified so
that called parties paid for the termination leg (but not the outbound leg) of
an inbound call might represent an alternative to the regulation of
termination charges for remedying the adverse public interest effects that we
had identified.” (here and below quotations from CC pp. 113-4)
The Commission at first seemed very sympathetic to this approach.
Such a system could be expected to bring about a greater concern on
the part of mobile customers about call termination charges and
encourage competition between the MNOs in the setting of
termination charges in order to gain customers. An additional
incentive to the MNOs to keep termination charges low would be the
desirability of encouraging customers to keep their mobiles switched
on, so that the MNOs would not lose termination business.
Oftel, too, was apparently sympathetic.
The DGT [Director General of Telecommunications] told us that he
accepted that a system of RPP was likely to remove the competition
problems associated with CPP, by increasing competitive pressures on
prices for inbound calls.
In its separate paper on this matter, Oftel went further: RPP “would probably
remove the need for further regulatory intervention”.26
BT too endorsed this view.
BT considered that RPP would, if it could be introduced, make call
termination charge control unnecessary, since it would remedy the
underlying cause – CPP – of the problem.
This is a quite remarkable support for RPP. By these accounts it constitutes a
solution to the problem of market power and competition, and makes
continued price control of termination charges unnecessary. What then are
the objections to it that are so serious as to render it less suitable than price
control?
b) the disadvantages of RPP
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 Receiving Party Pays compared to Calling Party Pays, Oftel, 19 April 2002 (paper
prepared for the CC and available on Oftel’s website). (Henceforth Oftel RPP 2002)
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According to Oftel, “the benefits of RPP were likely to be outweighed by
adverse effects on economic efficiency, and also in terms of consumer
resistance, and the initial costs of implementation. The DGT’s view,
therefore, was that the case for the introduction of RPP in the UK was
weak.” BT “accepted that RPP might be costly to implement and might lead
to mobile phone users turning off their phones to avoid paying for unwanted
incoming calls.”
The mobile operators and some third parties also objected. O2 said that
people would turn off their phones. Vodafone said there would be sub-
optimal usage of mobile services contrary to the objectives of section 3 of
the Act. Orange said that RPP would have distorting effects and would be
disruptive for customers and MNOs. T-mobile also said that compulsory
RPP would be disruptive but asked the Commission to recommend optional
RPP packages (which T-Mobile itself already offered). The International
Telecommunications Users Group (INTUG) said that RPP would be
disruptive, confusing and expensive. The Consumers Association (CA) said
that “the benefits of RPP had to be balanced against the evidence from other
markets, such as the USA, where RPP had constrained market growth
through encouraging customers not to keep their phones on, severely
undermining the network benefits offered by all MNOs”. The NCC said that
RPP would be disruptive to customers and operators.
In sum, there were four main objections to RPP. First, it would be
economically inefficient, in terms of the allocation of resources, including
the concern that it would lead to distortions and sub-optimal usage. Second,
it would be disruptive for the mobile operators and costly to implement.
Third, it would be disruptive to customers and therefore meet with consumer
resistance. Fourth, it would or might lead to subscribers turning off their
mobile phones.
What view did the Commission take of these proposed detriments? First, the
Commission did not make any explicit reference to efficiency
considerations: in particular, it did not endorse Oftel’s concern about adverse
effects on economic efficiency. Second, the Commission was not convinced
that cost and disruption to the operators was an obstacle: “The evidence we
received suggested that the MNOs might be able to change their systems to
RPP at reasonable cost.”
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The Commission’s sole concern was the effect of RPP on customers and
their usage (or lack of usage) of mobile phones:
a mandatory system of RPP would entail too many significant
disadvantages for consumers for us to recommend it as an appropriate
and proportionate remedy for the adverse public interest effects that
we have identified, not least because it might lead to significant
numbers of users switching off their mobile phones.
However, apart from the possibility that RPP “might [not “would”] lead to
significant numbers of consumers switching off their mobile phones”, the
nature of these “too many significant disadvantages for consumers”
remained unexplained. Oftel’s assessment of what it called ‘consumer
resistance’ may provide some insight.
In Oftel’s view, existing mobile users would react strongly against
having to pay to receive calls. Oftel would have a hard job explaining
that overall it was in their interests to pay for such calls when
previously they received them for free. Oftel believes that MNOs
would also be likely to criticise the changes, lobby against them, and
blame the CC and Oftel for their introduction. The political outfall
would be considerable.27
4. CPP, RPP and the efficient pattern of calling
Although the Commission did not take up or endorse Oftel’s analysis of the
effects of CPP and RPP on economic efficiency, this item took up most of
Oftel’s brief note to the Commission on RPP versus CPP. Moreover,
economic efficiency is the basis on which Oftel and the Commission have
justified their policy. It is therefore worth examining whether more weight
should have been attached to this economic efficiency analysis.
Oftel analyses the relative merits and disadvantages of CPP and RPP in
terms of the efficient pattern of calling. Assume that efficiency is defined in
terms of calls being made for which the sum of the (expected) value to the
caller and receiver exceeds the sum of the costs of originating and
terminating the call. Assume that prices charged reflect cost. Assume further
that the receiver can identify the caller without significant cost (e.g. from a
caller display system).
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 Oftel, RPP 2002, para 12, p. 4
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Under both CPP and RPP all calls that are actually made and completed are
“efficient” (in the sense that the total value to the parties exceeds the total
cost). Moreover, no “inefficient” calls will be made (they may be started but
the recipient will not accept them). However, in both systems some calls that
would be “efficient” will not be made. The difference between the two
systems lies simply in the nature of the “efficient” calls that are not made.
With RPP, there will be some “efficient” calls that are not made (more
precisely, not completed) because the value to the receiver is less than the
cost of termination, even though the value to the caller exceeds the total cost
of calling plus receiving. With CPP these calls would be made because there
is no charge for receiving calls. In respect of these calls, CPP is more
efficient than RPP.
However, with CPP there will also be some “efficient” calls that are not
made (more precisely, not initiated) because the value to the caller is less
than the aggregate cost of the call (even though it exceeds the cost of
origination) but where the value to the receiver exceeds the cost of
termination. With RPP these calls would be made because the caller would
be charged less than under CPP and the receiver would be willing and able
to pay the extra cost of the call. In respect of these calls, RPP is more
efficient than CPP.
The analysis is complicated by questions such as whether the recipient
knows the identity of the caller, and can make an informed estimate of the
value of receiving the call. Oftel points out that, with RPP, the receiver
might accept some calls that in retrospect do not have the expected value,
and might also reject some calls that (with more information) would have
been valued more highly. But it is also the case that with CPP the caller
might (in retrospect or with more information) have made more, fewer or
different calls.
Without further evidence, neither system can be said to be unambiguously
better than the other. Put crudely, RPP may be problematic where the caller
values the call highly but the receiver does not. But CPP may be problematic
where the caller does not value the call highly but the receiver does. Oftel
effectively recognises this, and provides no argument or evidence to suggest
that the set of potential problems and inefficiencies associated with RPP is
greater than the set associated with CPP.
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It has been argued elsewhere that “when both parties benefit from a call,
they should bear its costs in proportion to the benefit they receive.
Therefore, imposing all of the costs of an internetwork call on the calling
party’s network can be inefficient ….”.28 It is also arguable that some of
these problems, where of particular concern, could be overcome by
arrangements between subscribers.29
One further empirical consideration is very relevant here. The analysis has
hitherto assumed that charges for originating and terminating calls reflect
costs regardless of which system of charging is adopted. But in practice this
is not the case. There is abundant evidence from all around the world that
CPP leads to termination charges substantially in excess of cost – hence the
concern on the part of regulators in almost all CPP systems to introduce
price controls to reduce such charges. In contrast, as we shall see, there is
evidence from other countries that RPP does not lead to termination charges
in excess of cost, and in some countries the termination charges may be
negligible or zero.
This means that, in practice, the number and value of “efficient” calls that
are deterred by CPP are likely to be significant, whereas the number and
value of “efficient” calls that are deterred by RPP are likely to be negligible.
In terms of this aspect of economic efficiency, RPP is almost certainly
superior to CPP.
5. Switching off mobile phones
a) the perception
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 DeGraba 2003, abstract.
29
 For example, it is possible in the US for one subscriber to pay the costs incurred by
other nominated subscribers (e.g. dependents) in receiving calls. Oftel recognises the
possibility of internalisation, and asserts that “it is probable that CPP facilitates the
internalisation of a greater proportion of call externalities than RPP”. The only basis for
this is the suggestion that “the problem of mobile customers not publicising their number
is likely to be smaller”. But since mobile customers would have an incentive to ensure
that those whom they wished to call them would know their number, it is not clear that
this problem is of much practical significance, particularly if (as in RPP countries today)
the termination charge is low or zero. Crandall and Sidak 2004 discuss at some length the
practical scope for internalising externalities. Jeon et al 2001 provide a more formal
mathematical analysis and discuss some earlier references.
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The Commission rejected RPP because “RPP would entail too many
significant disadvantages for consumers .. not least because it might lead to
significant numbers of users switching off their mobile phones”. What is the
evidence for this switching off?
Three witnesses – O2, BT and CA – are reported as making the claim.
Oftel’s paper referred to “some users turning off their handsets (as in the
USA)”. To substantiate this it provided the statistic that “in USA 20% of
mobile customers never switch their phones on except to make a call”.30
However, none of these parties is reported as providing any further evidence
for the claim.31 Nor did the Commission itself cite any evidence.
Elsewhere, other commentators reflect or report a similar perception. For
example
Some have argued that under an MPP system, a mobile subscriber has
an incentive to switch off his mobile phone when not placing calls, so
as to avoid being charged for incoming calls.32
Experience from receiving party pays (RPP) regimes, e.g. in the
United States, indicate that consumers are wary of switching their
mobile phones on or using them at all when they fear overspending.33
Proponents of the CPP system argue that RPP discourages mobile use.
Subscribers in RPP countries are much more likely to turn their phone
off, or refuse to answer calls, in order to avoid paying for them.34
But again, none of the commentators give any evidence to support this.35
b) evidence?
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 Oftel RPP 2002, para 5 and Table and footnote accompanying para 3.
31
 I understand that Oftel attributes the 20% statistic to evidence provided to the CC by
the industry. I have not seen this evidence.
32
 Crandall and Sidak 2004 p.16.
33
 Feldmann 2003, p. 6
34
 Rohan Samarajiva and William H Melody, Briefing Paper, Fixed-Mobile
Interconnection Workshop, ITU New Initiatives Program, Geneva, 20-22 September
2000.
35
 Crandall and Sidak 2004 reference Hausman 2002 p. 595. However, Hausman does not
make this specific claim. He simply comments that “As a consequence [of RPP] many
US mobile customers do not give out their mobile number”, before noting that this effect
is now decreasing. The Crandall and Sidak footnote seems to refer to their following
sentence, which makes the same point as Hausmann.
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In 2002 the ITU held a Workshop on mobile interconnection, which might
be expected to provide some evidence.36 The case study of India, where the
courts blocked the proposed change from RPP to CPP, does not mention
mobile phones being switched off.37 The case study on Mexico, which did
change to RPP, observes that there was an increased degree of congestion,
and notes as a possible explanatory factor that  “under the CPP system the
majority of the mobile users do not disconnect their telephones as used to be
the case when called party pays was the ruling system”.38
The ITU case study on China and Hong Kong, both of which still have RPP,
records some phones on “stand-by” in China.
Due to this RPP regime, carrying both a mobile phone handset and a
radio pager simultaneously has become a common phenomenon in
many places across China. The mobile phone is mainly used to
originate calls while the pager is used to help the subscriber decide
whether or not a prompt reply is needed. The mobile phone remains in
stand-by most of the time. In this way the subscriber can save some
money by avoiding receiving and paying for unimportant calls.
However, this has frustrated the usage behaviour of subscribers as
their convenience is sacrificed. As a result there has been a strong
demand for the introduction of CPP regime in China.39
However, “the regulator was very reluctant to move to a CPP regime”.40
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 See Samarajiva and Melody above, and Samarajiva 2001.
37
 “Fixed-Mobile Interconnection: The case of India”, Lara Srivastava and Sidhartha
Sinha, Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Workshop, ITU New Initiatives Program, Geneva,
20-22 September 2000. See also Srinavasta and Sinha 2001.
38
 “Fixed-Mobile Interconnection: The case of Mexico”, Arturo Briceno, Fixed-Mobile
Interconnection Workshop, ITU New Initiatives Program, Geneva, 20-22 September
2000, p. 25. The paper notes the increased number of calls after the move to CPP (despite
the increased call prices). It offers as a “possible explanation” (advanced by a colleague)
that “Before CPP, a mobile subscriber used to keep off his mobile at certain times to
avoid receiving unwanted calls that had to be paid by him for receiving the call”, thereby
creating a degree of ‘repressed traffic’, whereas after CPP there is no need to do so. See
also Zehle 2003.
39
 Fixed-Mobile Interconnection: The case of China and Hong Kong SAR, Xu Yan,
Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Workshop, ITU New Initiatives Program, Geneva, 20-22
September 2000, p. 10.
40
 “The major concern behind the regulator’s reluctance to change is that a transition to
CPP might lead to the immediate shrinkage of the paging branch of China Unicom, in
which the Chinese government had invested heavily in past years. [“the state-owned new
entrant China Unicom operated the largest radio paging service in the country”].
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In contrast, although the RPP policy applies in Hong Kong too, the reaction
there is quite different: “Due to relatively low tariffs resulting from
competition and relatively high per capita incomes, neither the regulator nor
the operators have been subjected to the pressure [for] moving to a CPP
regime.”41
One final report comes from St Kitts & Nevis: “Our customers were
extremely pleased with the introduction of CPP. Before CPP many
customers kept their phones switched off, but now everyone keeps their
phone on.”42
There are thus several reports of mobile phones being switched off to avoid
paying termination charges, at least in certain parts of the world where the
mobile networks were then little developed. But there seems to be no
quantitative evidence anywhere on what proportion of mobile subscribers
are claimed to have switched off their phones, nor on what proportion of the
time these phones are off. Whether these proportions are about 10% or 90%
or somewhere in between is unknown. Nor are there comparable figures for
CPP networks, which is relevant since subscribers switch off mobile phones
even there, in order to avoid being disturbed at inconvenient times or simply
to avoid running down the battery, and it is presumably the difference
between the proportions for the CPP and RPP systems that is of concern.
This lack of quantification is a rather unsatisfactory basis for serious
policymaking (which an RPI-15 price cap surely is).43
c) other evidence
                                                                                                                                                
Moreover, it was feared that the introduction of CPP would increase the overhead budget
of governmental departments and state-owned enterprises still dominating the Chinese
economy.”
41
 Id p. 12
42
 Mobile Marketing, Cable & Wireless, St Kitts & Nevis, cited in Zehle 2003, p. 10.
43
 Whether more mobile phones being switched off is an unambiguous detriment also
seems worth a little consideration. If switching off prevents the receiver from unwanted
disruption, or receiving (and paying for) an unwanted call, then it represents a benefit.
There must also be many people who would welcome a reduction in the number of
mobile phones switched on, particularly in trains, restaurants, shops and public places.
Some provision is beginning to be made for this in public places, but the welfare analyses
do not seem to consider this factor.
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It might be argued that the precise extent of switching off mobile phones is
not very relevant. The main issue is whether CPP leads to limiting of
inbound calls, whether by switching off or by other methods such as using
calling line identification (CLI) devices to decide whether or not to accept a
call, not distributing the telephone number widely, or indeed changing the
telephone number.44
There seems to be clearer evidence that a change from RPP to CPP can
increase the number of inbound calls. For example, after Mexico switched
from RPP to CPP on 16 April 1999, “there was a significant increase
incoming mobile traffic (+ 28.7 per cent), despite the fact that the effective
fixed-to-mobile tariff went up from US$0.115 to US$0.403 per minute (i.e.
250 per cent).”45 An increase in traffic after such a change in system is said
to be true more generally.
All evidence available to me suggests that when a change from RPP to
CPP is made inbound and outbound call volumes increase
substantially. This suggests that RPP system substantially inhibits
inbound call volumes and also outbound call volumes. 46
A study of the countries that have changed from RPP to CPP systems is in
no doubt about the significant impact that the change has had.
The introduction of CPP in Central and South America and the
Caribbean between 1995 and 2002 more or less showed the same
pattern [as in Pakistan and Mexico].
- CPP was a contributing factor in accelerating the growth in mobile
subscribers.
- Average monthly mobile terminated minutes per customer increased.
- The introduction of CPP lead to an increase in gross margins for fixed
and mobile operators.47
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 “In India while RPP was still in effect, mobile phone users were interviewed as to
reason for churning (i.e. terminating one number and taking out a new one). It emerged
that an important reason was that the number got known too widely.” Stefan Zehle,
personal communication, 30 October 2003.
45
 Samarajiva and Melody, 2000, Box 1, p. 4. Attributed source Mexico Case Study. An
associated Figure shows that incoming mobile traffic increased from 73 to 94 minutes of
use per subscriber, while outgoing mobile traffic reduced from 89 to 83 minutes per
subscriber.
46
 Stefan Zehle, personal communication, 24 October 2003.
47
 Zehle 2003, p. 10.
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For policymakers in Europe it is relevant to ask how these various
magnitudes relate to the level of termination charges and the level of
(national and personal) income. How far is the experience of a developing
country indicative of what would happen in a more developed one?
Arguably experience in North America might be more relevant in
considering the possible effect of a RPP policy in the UK and Europe
generally. It is therefore particularly important to consider experience of
RPP in the USA.
6. US experience
a) switching off in the early days
It  has been argued that RPP in the US reduced the number of incoming
calls.
Typically in the USA with wireless party pays tariffing inbound call
minutes account for 26%-30% of total call minutes.  In calling party
pays environments traffic is initially 40% inbound, but as numbers are
circulated widely in some networks inbound minutes account for
nearly 50% of internetwork traffic.48
A market trial by one US operator suggested that switching from RPP to
CPP would lead to more inbound calls.
In 1994 AT&T Wireless conducted extensive calling party pays
market trials.  These trials showed that over time inbound calls
minutes for customers who converted to CPP increased from 26% of
total minutes to 32% within approximately half a year.  Over time the
increase is likely to be substantially higher.49
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that switching off may indeed have
occurred in the early days of US mobile telephony.50 Withholding of
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 Stefan Zehle, Coleago Consulting Ltd, “Customer Acceptance of CPP and Effect on
Market Growth”, IIR Calling Party Pays Conference, San Francisco, USA, March 1998,
p.10.
49
 Id. p. 11
50
 E.g. “On the claim that mobile phone users under MPP tend to have their handsets off
and withhold their phone numbers, certainly this was true in my experience in the first 3-
4 years of usage in the US.” Eric Ralph, personal communication, 13 October 2003.
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telephone numbers is also reported there, this time with an element of
quantification.51
b) the situation now
However, most of this evidence is from the mid-1990s, which were the early
days of US mobiles. US conditions have changed considerably since then,
not least because mobile operators have taken steps to reduce or eliminate
the financial obstacles to making and receiving mobile calls. These steps
include providing “buckets” of free minutes that may apply to incoming as
well as outgoing calls, making the first minute of any incoming call free to
the receiver, providing free caller ID, and reducing the charge for receiving
calls.52
Oftel concurs. After its remark about 20% of US phones turned off, it adds
the footnote “The trend may have changed recently, as US MNOs have
recently introduced packages with generous quantities of bundled free
minutes covering both inbound and outbound calls.” Other commentators
too agree that the US situation is now different.53
The FCC has recently dealt explicitly with this issue, since at one time there
was a possibility of the US changing to CPP.
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 “… customer research carried out by Bell Atlantic (2001) … found that personal users
in the US had relatively limited distribution of their mobile number under RPP. The main
reason cited (by 33% of personal users who did not distribute their number) was that it
costs them to receive calls.” Modelling the UK mobile market: The potential impact of a
switch to receiving party pays. A report prepared for Vodafone, Frontier Economics,
London, October 2002. Annex 3 p. A 28. (This is an unpublished report, hereafter cited
as Frontier Modelling.) The Bell Atlantic study is not further referenced there.
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 The correspondent in the previous footnote continues “This was, as I remember it, one
of the explicit reasons for the first free incoming minute, and also for caller ID being
standard (that is, free) on these phones (making it possible for the paying mobile
subscriber to screen calls). … Calls were much more expensive then. … the buckets were
much smaller and the fixed fees and out-of-bucket per minute prices much higher than
they are now. I certainly was personally concerned about receiving calls then, whereas
today I care only marginally. This may be in small part due to habituation, but price has
played a very important role.”
53
 E.g. “… it is often argued that subscribers withhold disclosure of their numbers to deter
unwanted incoming calls. However, with digital systems, caller line identification (CLI)
and tariffs which permit the first minute of an incoming call to be free, such as practised
by Sprint PCS, help to prevent this.” Doyle and Smith 1998, p. 482. See also Hausman
2002; Crandall and Sidak 2004.
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In theory, MPP [RPP] creates an incentive for wireless subscribers to
switch off their mobile phones when not placing calls to avoid being
charged for incoming calls, and for the same reason it also
discourages them from giving out their mobile phone number. In
contrast, CPP theoretically has the potential to stimulate mobile usage
by increasing the accessibility of mobile subscribers to incoming calls,
and also by allowing mobile subscribers to devote their entire wireless
budget to outgoing calls.
In practice, U.S. mobile operators have managed to counter the
potentially adverse incentive effects of MPP [RPP] by introducing
bucket plans to stimulate usage.54 As noted above, progressive
increases in the size of mobile buckets have been a major driver of
average mobile usage in the United States. Bucket plans may increase
the accessibility of mobile subscribers to their friends and family in an
environment in which they pay for both incoming and outgoing
calls.55 At the same time, high mobile termination rates in Europe and
other CPP environments may discourage people from calling mobile
subscribers by increasing the cost of placing calls to mobile phones.56
c) comparison of termination charges and prices
The comparison between US and European termination charges is quite
striking.57 In 1999 the fixed-to-mobile interconnection rates in 13 European
countries, all using CPP, ranged from $0.156/minute to $0.300/minute with
a mean of $0.206, median $0.200. (The UK rate was $0.160.) In the US the
rate was $0.020 – a tenfold difference - and in Canada the rate was zero.
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 “Nextgen VII at 28 [Linda Mutschler et al, The Next Generation VII, Merrill Lynch
Equity Research, 21 February 2003]. We note that at least one U.S. carrier has begun
offering plans with free incoming minutes. See Nextel, Nextel Free Incoming Plans
(visited June 3, 2003) http://www.
Nextel.com/phones_plans/promos/promo_free_incoming.shtml” (footnote in original)
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 Id. (footnote in original)
56
 8th Mobile Report, paras 212-213
57
 The following data are from Samarajiva and Melody 2000, Figs 5, 6 pp. 11-13.  Their
source is given as ITU 2000 Regulatory Survey. Feldmann 2003 reprints their Figure 6 as
Fig 9, p. 25.
28
A similar contrast between RPP and CPP systems applied elsewhere in the
world.58 The difference in overall average between RPP and CPP systems
was of the order of 20-fold.59
Rates have since come down: in 2003 the FCC cited an average of just over
$0.16 for Europe versus $0.005 for US.60 However, the contrast between the
systems is even stronger: the difference is now 30-fold.61 In fact, for RPP
countries generally the termination charge is negligible or zero.
Of course, termination rates are only part of the cost of making a call, but
even taking other costs into account the difference between the two types of
system remains. For 8 CPP countries the average revenue per minute in early
2003 ranged from $0.10 to $0.30 with a median of $0.21 (UK $0.22),
whereas in the US the average revenue was $0.12 and in Canada $0.11. The
average cost per call-minute in UK and Europe is thus about double the
average cost in US and Canada.62
d) comparison of subscriber penetration and usage
At one time, it was not obvious whether RPP or CPP had a significant effect
on subscriber penetration.
Analysing wireless mobile telephony market penetration growth in the
different European countries and the USA does not suggest that
calling party pays leads to faster market growth.  At the end of June
1997, wireless penetration in the USA had reached 19%, compared to
11% in Europe.  Penetration rates in Europe varied widely from 6.5%
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 For 9 selected non-European countries, all using CPP, the corresponding range was
from $0.017/minute to $0.293/minute with a mean of $0.128 (median $0.078). For 4
Asian countries using RPP (China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Sri Lanka) the range was
zero to $0.008 with a mean of $0.002 (median $0.0006).
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 The average over all countries responding to the ITU survey is given as $0.105 for CPP
versus $0.005 for RPP. Petrazzini has $0.092 versus $0.005. This seems to be the source
for 9.20 US cents versus 0.05 US cents in Oftel (2002); the last figure should presumably
have been 0.50 cents.
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 8th Mobile Report, citing Mutschler, Nextgen VII.
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 Crandall and Sidak 2004 point out that account needs to be taken of origination charges
also, which for one US operator amount to $0.09/minute. Even so (and without including
origination charges in Europe) the difference in total price is nearly two-fold.
62
 Crandall and Sidak 2004, Table 2, p. 17, citing Mutschler, NextGen VII and other
research.
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in Belgium to 34.5% in Finland.  Penetration in Finland at the end of
1997 reached 41.9%.  The WPP [RPP] market with the highest
penetration in the world is Hong Kong, where at the end of June 1997
penetration reached 24.4%.
Currently there is no quantifiable correlation between penetration and
whether CPP or wireless party pays (WPP) [RPP] tariffing is applied.
Other factors such as incomes, tariff levels, competition, promotion
and cultural factors impact significantly more on differences in
penetration.  However, in the longer term CPP is likely to lead to
more rapid market growth and higher penetration levels.63
The author of that passage has recently reaffirmed the second paragraph
cited, adding that “While MPP certainly has held back growth in the US and
Canada, some countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore have achieved
very high penetration rates without moving to CPP.”64 To illustrate this latter
point, mobile penetration rates in 2000 showed the US 40% and Canada
28.5%, compared to EU area 62.5% and UK 67%, but Singapore 68.3% and
Hong Kong 80.1%.65
Penetration rates have since increased generally. In late 2002 or early 2003
the penetration rates were 37% for Canada and 49% (or 43%?) for the US.
For the 8 CPP countries mentioned above, the penetration ratio ranged from
62% to 93% of the population, with a median of 70% (UK 85%).66
Not surprisingly, however, lower call prices in RPP countries induce a
higher average calling rate. In the 8 CPP countries the range is 72 to 296
minutes of use per subscriber per month, with a median of 158 minutes (UK
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 Zehle, 1998. Note: Samarajiva and Melody 2000, Box 4, p. 10 explain that Finland is
an exceptional system in that it uses CPP but in most cases termination rates are not used
there.
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 Zehle 2003, p. 11
65
 Frontier, Modelling, Annex 3, Table A1, p. A 22. Source given as OECD, Working
Party on Telecommunications and Information Services Policies – Cellular Mobile
Pricing Structures and Trends, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry,
Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy, 2000.
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 Crandall and Sidak 2004, Table 2, p. 17. There seems to be a discrepancy between the
US figure of 49% in the table and the figure of 43% at the top of the range. The table
does not give figures for Singapore and Hong Kong.
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132 minutes). In contrast, in Canada the average usage is 270 minutes and in
the US 458 minutes.
Several other factors besides CPP and RPP are presumably at work here.
Higher penetration rates may attract subscribers who make fewer calls. In
addition, over the last few years there has been a strong drive to attract pre-
payment customers, particularly in the UK.67 They account for 69% of all
UK subscribers, in contrast with 5% of US subscribers.68 They are also said
to have lower average usage rates. Whether this is independent of the type of
system is debateable: the attractiveness of prepaid subscriptions is likely to
have been enhanced by the high termination charges characteristic of the
CPP system, and perhaps by the greater controllability of expenditure under
that system.69 There are also suggestions that the CPP penetration rates may
be overstated because they do not always correct for handsets no longer in
use.70
Whether CPP is likely to lead to higher penetration levels indefinitely is not
clear. Penetration has been growing in all countries, but presumably there
comes a limit when everyone has a mobile phone. The extent of mobile
usage in the US and Canada is still remarkably low in some respects,
particularly international calls.71 But it has been argued that the penetration
rate itself has been growing in the US until 2002, that penetration has been
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 “One of the most commonly cited factors contributing to subscribership growth has
been the emergence of pre-paid mobile services, which facilitate access to individuals
unable to acquire fixed lines due to insufficient credit history.” Telegeography 2002, p.
78. The ability to budget via prepayments has also been an added attraction of prepaid
services in the UK energy sector, and may well be of greater importance in European
telecoms sectors where local calls are not free as in the US.
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 Crandall and Sidak 2004, Table 2, p. 17.
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 Frontier Modelling p. A 25
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 “…it has been argued by the FCC that with pre-paid subscribers, there is a greater
potential for miscalculating the number of ‘active’ subscriptions; higher churn among
pre-paid customers coupled with delays on the part of mobile operators in up-dating their
customers records means that new subscribers recorded each year may in fact be
switchers and not genuine increases in penetration. The implication is that increases in
subscriptions and penetration in Western Europe may be slightly overstated.” Frontier
Modelling, Annex 3, p. A 25.
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 In 2002, the percentage of international traffic originated from mobiles in Africa, Latin
America & Caribbean, Europe and Asia & Pacific ranged from about 17% to about 24%,
compared to about 4% in US & Canada. For incoming traffic the corresponding ranges
were about 24% to about 32% compared to about 5%. Telegeography 2004, Figures 2 &
3, pp. 44,45.
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increasing rapidly in the US and Canada, and in both countries is likely to
equal the penetration rates of CPP countries in the near term.72
7. Conclusions
There has been widespread and increasing concern, throughout much of the
world, at the level of mobile termination charges. To deal with this,
increasingly severe price controls have been put in place or are in prospect.
Oftel and the Competition Commission identified the Caller Pays Principle
(CPP) as the source of the market power that enabled mobile operators to set
termination charges above cost. They also recognised, as economists have
argued, that this in turn provides the incentive to attract new subscribers onto
the system by offering subsidised handsets and lower subscription charges.
This means that competition between mobile operators can reduce or remove
monopoly profits despite the high termination charges.
Both Oftel and the Commission accepted that the alternative Receiver Pays
Principle (RPP) would be a solution to the monopoly problem. RPP would
encourage competition and encourage operators to keep mobile charges
down. This paper has shown that evidence from countries where RPP is in
effect, particularly the US, is fully consistent with this view.
Oftel and the Commission nonetheless rejected RPP, and instead proposed
more severe price controls. The Commission did not endorse Oftel’s
argument that RPP could lead to an economically inefficient pattern of
calling (in terms of whether the aggregate value of a call exceeded the
aggregate cost). The analysis in this paper has shown that there is no reason
to expect that RPP is less efficient than CPP in this respect. Indeed, since
CPP leads in practice to termination charges significantly in excess of cost
this means that CPP is almost certainly a less economically efficient system
than RPP.
Nor did the Commission accept that a change to RPP would be unduly
disruptive or costly to mobile operators. No doubt there would be
transitional costs. But the evidence that the Commission received suggested
that operators might be able to change their systems to RPP at reasonable
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 Crandall and Sidak 2004, p. 18. They project that US penetration should equal
penetration in most CPP countries between 2008 and 2014.
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cost. This is not to say that the mobile operators would welcome it. If Oftel
and the Commission are right that the CPP system as presently operates
facilitates a transfer of income from fixed to mobile systems, and if retail
competition does not eliminate this transfer entirely, then some operators
might prefer CPP, provided the controls on termination charges were not too
severe.
The sole reason for the Commission’s decision was that RPP would entail
too many significant disadvantages for consumers, not least because it might
lead to significant numbers of users switching off their mobile phones. This
argument is difficult to endorse. No significant evidence was adduced to
support the proposition that users would turn off their phones. Others have
claimed that his happened, typically in countries at an early stage of mobile
development, but there seems to be no measure of this.
There is evidence that in earlier times and in systems at an early stage of
development, RPP did reduce the level of usage, whether by encouraging
subscribers to switch off phones, make phone numbers less available, not
accept calls, and so on. In Mexico and other countries, mainly in South
America and Asia, the volume of calls as well as number of subscribers
increased after a change from RPP to CPP. The number of subscribers is
also lower in the US and Canada, where RPP obtains, but much higher in
Hong Kong and Singapore.
The view of the FCC and others is that in practice any reduction of usage no
longer applies in the US today. Mobile operators have countered any such
adverse incentive in a variety of ways, not least by offering low-priced or
free incoming minutes. Indeed, the average termination charge now seems to
be negligible or even zero in all the RPP countries, in contrast with an
average charge of over 16 cents per minute in Europe. In the light of
experience in RPP countries generally, it is no longer tenable (if indeed it
ever was) to argue that a change from CPP to RPP would lead to a
significant number of users switching off their mobile phones, at least in the
UK.
Would RPP have other significant disadvantages for customers? There could
well be an increase in the subscription charge and a reduction or removal of
the subsidy on handsets. It is possible that this could lead to a reduction in
the penetration rate, which is roughly twice as high in Europe as in the US at
present. Some consumers (“those who make more lower price calls or
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mainly receive calls or who make little use of their mobile phones”) would
no longer be unfairly subsidised, as the Commission put it. But any
reduction in penetration, if at all, is not likely to be great.73 It is also likely to
be only temporary, since the penetration rate is increasing rapidly in the US,
and one might expect that the European penetration rate would eventually
resume its level and pattern of increase over time.
Customers might object to the principle of paying to receive calls. But this is
essentially a matter of custom. In the US and other RPP countries it is an
accepted practice. In fact, consumer groups there opposed a change to
CPP.74 Moreover, the levels of termination charges in modern RPP systems
are negligible and do not represent a barrier to usage.
Indeed, RPP would have a major benefit to customers in that significantly
lower call charges can be expected to enable significantly higher levels of
usage per customer: in the US and Canada average usage is some two to
three times the average levels in the UK and Europe. Partly this is likely to
be the consequence of a lower penetration rate, but not entirely.
As to whether the outcome of the RPP system is to be preferred to that of the
CPP system, the logic of the position taken by Oftel and the Commission is
essentially Yes. Their stated aim is an efficient allocation of resources,
undistorted by excessive termination charges and subsidised handsets, and
their preference is to achieve this aim by competition where possible. Their
aim, in short, is to change the outcome from that which is observed in CPP
countries around the world, to that which is observed in RPP countries.
There is now clear evidence that this aim can be achieved by competition
without severe and intrusive price controls, and that consumers in general
can expect to benefit.
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 An unpublished study commissioned by Vodafone calculated that RPP would imply a
64% penetration rate for the UK compared to then-existing rates of 70% in the UK and
just over 40% in the US. Frontier, Modelling, p. 30.
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 “In particular, the Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel (OPC), the Consumer
Federation of America (CFA) and the Consumer Union (CU) submitted joint comments
to the FCC arguing against CPP. The reasons cited included the fact that prices would
rise for the calling party and this would reduce accessibility to mobile users …” Frontier,
Modelling, p. A32, citing Joint comments of the Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel,
Consumer Federation of America an Consumer Union (OPC/CFA/CU) dated September
1999 on FCC Notice of Inquiry, WT Docket No. 97-207.
34
A switch from CPP to RPP would avert a possible conflict between US and
EU regulatory authorities. It is natural to ask whether the same policy
recommendation should apply to fixed as well as mobile networks. Many of
the same factors apply, although to some extent the costs of access are there
recovered in the line rental, and the scope for subsidising handsets has been
limited by policy. The goal of regulatory consistency and the possibilities of
convergence between mobile and fixed suggest that this issue deserves
further investigation.
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